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Baring, Wellington and the Resurrection of French Public Finances Following Waterloo

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  • Oosterlinck, Kim
  • Ureche-Rangau, Loredana
  • Vaslin, Jacques-Marie

Abstract

Following Waterloo, managing French public finances represented a daunting task as the country had lost a substantial part of its population and territory and had to pay huge amounts as reparations to the victors. Despite this, in just ten years, France managed to issue substantial amounts of debt with a spread, compared to the British consol, falling from more than 400 to 100 basis points. We argue that the Duke of Wellington was key in creating an environment in which Baring had an incentive to lend to France and all actors had an incentive to see French debts reimbursed.

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  • Oosterlinck, Kim & Ureche-Rangau, Loredana & Vaslin, Jacques-Marie, 2014. "Baring, Wellington and the Resurrection of French Public Finances Following Waterloo," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(4), pages 1072-1102, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:74:y:2014:i:04:p:1072-1102_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Bignon, Vincent & Flandreau, Marc, 2018. "The Other Way: A Narrative History of the Bank of France," CEPR Discussion Papers 13138, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Accominotti, Olivier & Albers, Thilo & Kessler, Philipp & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023. "Sovereign defaults and international trade: Germany and its creditors in the 1930s," CEPR Discussion Papers 18703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Oosterlinck Kim & Panizza Ugo & Weidemaier Mark & Gulati Mitu, 2022. "The Odious Haitian Independence Debt," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 339-378, December.
    4. Accominotti, Olivier & Albers, Thilo & Kessler, Philipp & Oosterlinck, Kim, 2023. "Sovereign defaults and international trade: Germany and its creditors in the 1930s," CEPR Discussion Papers 18703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Flandreau, Marc, 2017. "Reputation, Regulation and the Collapse of International Capital Markets, 1920-1935," CEPR Discussion Papers 11747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Mitchener, Kris & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century: Looking Backward, Looking Forward," CEPR Discussion Papers 15935, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Ureche-Rangau, Loredana & Vaslin, Jacques-Marie, 2023. "Conversion risk on 19th century French consols and embedded options: A simple exercise," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PB).

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