IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13915.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications

Author

Listed:
  • Cecchetti, Stephen
  • Schoenholtz, Kermit L.

Abstract

The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) publishes vast amounts of information regarding monetary policy, including its goals, strategy and outlook. By reinforcing the commitment to price stability and maximum sustainable employment, this transparency has helped improve U.S. economic performance in recent decades. Based on two dozen interviews with policy experts, we identify three objectives that guide our search for further improvements in communications practices: simplifying public statements, clarifying how policy will react to changing conditions, and highlighting uncertainty and risks. As examples, we propose a simpler post-meeting policy statement and the introduction of a concise Report on Economic Projections, the elements of which are mostly available in existing publications. A broader, systematic application of these objectives could also help the FOMC streamline other aspects of its communications framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Cecchetti, Stephen & Schoenholtz, Kermit L., 2019. "Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications," CEPR Discussion Papers 13915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13915
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP13915
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas M. Mertens & John C. Williams, 2019. "Monetary Policy Frameworks and the Effective Lower Bound on Interest Rates," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 109, pages 427-432, May.
    2. Gust, Christopher & López-Salido, David & Meyer, Steve, 2017. "Asymmetric monetary policy and the effective lower bound," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 441-451.
    3. John C. Williams, 2019. "Monetary policy: a 'data dependent' approach: remarks at the New Jersey Bankers Association's Economic Leadership Forum, Somerset, New Jersey," Speech 304, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Coibion, Olivier & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Kumar, Saten & Pedemonte, Mathieu, 2020. "Inflation expectations as a policy tool?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    5. Paul A. Samuelson, 2011. "Why We Should Not Make Mean Log of Wealth Big Though Years to Act Are Long," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & Edward O Thorp & William T Ziemba (ed.), THE KELLY CAPITAL GROWTH INVESTMENT CRITERION THEORY and PRACTICE, chapter 34, pages 491-493, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    7. Janet Yellen, 2018. "Comments on Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(2 (Fall)), pages 573-579.
    8. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    9. John C. Driscoll & Aart C. Kraay, 1998. "Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation With Spatially Dependent Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 549-560, November.
    10. Reifschneider, David & Willams, John C, 2000. "Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 936-966, November.
    11. Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March.
    12. J. Scott Davis & Mark A. Wynne, 2016. "Central bank communications: a case study," Globalization Institute Working Papers 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    13. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    14. Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, 2014. "Making sense of dissents: a history of FOMC dissents," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 96(3), pages 213-227.
    15. Kevin L. Kliesen & Brian Levine & Christopher J. Waller, 2019. "Gauging Market Responses to Monetary Policy Communication," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 101(2), pages 69-91.
    16. Alan Greenspan, 2004. "Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 33-40, May.
    17. Feroli, Michael & Greenlaw, David & Hooper, Peter & Mishkin, Frederic S. & Sufi, Amir, 2017. "Language after liftoff: Fed communication away from the zero lower bound," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 452-490.
    18. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    19. David L. Reifschneider & John C. Williams, 2000. "Three lessons for monetary policy in a low-inflation era," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 936-978.
    20. Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Strasser, Georg, 2019. "Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 93-112.
    21. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Andrew Haldane & Michael McMahon, 2018. "Central Bank Communications and the General Public," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 108, pages 578-583, May.
    23. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    24. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2005. "Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con," NBER Working Papers 11537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The Fed's Crystal Ball: Looking Beyond the COVID-19 Recession
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2020-06-15 11:14:52
    2. Stopping central banks from being prisoners of financial markets
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2021-04-19 12:12:24

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Davig, Troy & Foerster, Andrew, 2023. "Communicating Monetary Policy Rules," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    2. Michael Ehrmann & Sarah Holton & Danielle Kedan & Gillian Phelan, 2024. "Monetary Policy Communication: Perspectives from Former Policymakers at the ECB," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 837-864, June.
    3. Schmeling, Maik & Schrimpf, Andreas & Steffensen, Sigurd A.M., 2022. "Monetary policy expectation errors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 841-858.
    4. Anjali Karol, 2020. "A Decade After the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Policy for International Stability," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 11(2), pages 416-423, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kryvtsov, Oleksiy & Petersen, Luba, 2021. "Central bank communication that works: Lessons from lab experiments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 760-780.
    2. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Jakob de Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2024. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 62(2), pages 425-457, June.
    3. Glas, Alexander & Müller, Lena, 2021. "Talking in a language that everyone can understand? Transparency of speeches by the ECB Executive Board," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 01/2021, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    4. Bernardo Candia & Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2020. "Communication and the Beliefs of Economic Agents," NBER Working Papers 27800, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carlos Madeira & Joao Madeira, 2015. "Dissent in FOMC Meeting and the Announcement Drift," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 749, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Carlos Madeira & João Madeira, 2019. "The Effect of FOMC Votes on Financial Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(5), pages 921-932, December.
    7. Hubert, Paul & Labondance, Fabien, 2021. "The signaling effects of central bank tone," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    8. Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Tho Pham & Oleksandr Talavera, 2023. "The Voice of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(2), pages 548-584, February.
    9. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Petra M. Geraats, 2009. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 235-268, August.
    11. Dridi, Ichrak & Boughrara, Adel, 2023. "Flexible inflation targeting and stock market volatility: Evidence from emerging market economies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    12. Alexander Jung & Patrick Kuehl, 2021. "Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 68(3), pages 298-321, July.
    13. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Monique Reid & Pierre Siklos, 2020. "Building Credibility and Influencing Expectations The Evolution of Central Bank Communication," Working Papers 10144, South African Reserve Bank.
    15. Bianchi, Francesco & Melosi, Leonardo & Rottner, Matthias, 2021. "Hitting the elusive inflation target," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 107-122.
    16. Christopher S. Sutherland, 2020. "Forward Guidance and Expectation Formation: A Narrative Approach," Staff Working Papers 20-40, Bank of Canada.
    17. Celso Brunetti & Marc Joëts & Valérie Mignon, 2023. "Reasons Behind Words: OPEC Narratives and the Oil Market," Working Papers 2023-19, CEPII research center.
    18. Weber, Michael & D'Acunto, Francesco & Fuster, Andreas, 2021. "Diverse Policy Committees Can Reach Underrepresented Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 16563, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Tong, Matthew, 2019. "The long-run information effect of central bank communication," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 185-202.
    20. Baranowski, Paweł & Doryń, Wirginia & Łyziak, Tomasz & Stanisławska, Ewa, 2021. "Words and deeds in managing expectations: Empirical evidence from an inflation targeting economy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 49-67.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank communication; Federal Reserve; Forward guidance; Monetary policy; Reaction functions; Policy transparency; Monetary policy credibility; Central bank accountability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13915. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.