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Making sense of dissents: a history of FOMC dissents

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Abstract

This article presents a record of dissents on Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) monetary policy votes from the Committee?s inception in its modern form in 1936 through 2013. Dissents were rare during the Committee?s first 20 years but began to increase in the late 1950s. The number of dissents increased sharply during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when both inflation and unemployment were unusually high. However, at other times, the number of dissents was not correlated with either inflation or the unemployment rate. A review of FOMC records and published statements indicates that dissents often reflect fundamental disagreement about (i) how to achieve the Committee?s macroeconomic objectives and (ii) the current stance of policy. The number of dissents also appears to have been influenced by the language used by the FOMC to communicate instructions to the manager of the System Open Market Account.

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  • Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, 2014. "Making sense of dissents: a history of FOMC dissents," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 96(3), pages 213-227.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:00025
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    Cited by:

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    4. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
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    7. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
    8. Jung, Alexander, 2016. "Have minutes helped to predict fed funds rate changes?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 18-32.
    9. Ehrmann, Michael & Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2023. "Central Bank Communication by ??? The Economics of Public Policy Leaks," CEPR Discussion Papers 18152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Cecchetti, Stephen & Schoenholtz, Kermit L., 2019. "Improving U.S. Monetary Policy Communications," CEPR Discussion Papers 13915, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
    12. Paul D. Mueller, 2016. "Public and Private Institutions in the Federal Reserve," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Fall 2016), pages 49-68.
    13. Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    14. Carlos Madeira & Joao Madeira, 2015. "Dissent in FOMC Meeting and the Announcement Drift," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 749, Central Bank of Chile.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

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