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News and Archival Information in Games

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  • Spiegler, Ran

Abstract

I enrich the typology of players in the standard model of games with incomplete information, by allowing them to have incomplete "archival information" - namely, piecemeal knowledge of correlations among relevant variables. A player is characterized by the conventional Harsanyi type (a.k.a "news-information") as well as the novel "archive-information", formalized as a collection of subsets of variables. The player can only learn the marginal distributions over these subsets of variables. The player extrapolates a well-specified probabilistic belief according to the maximum-entropy criterion. This formalism expands our ability to capture strategic situations with "boundedly rational expectations." I demonstrate the expressive power and use of this formalism with some examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiegler, Ran, 2018. "News and Archival Information in Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 12805, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12805
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
    2. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5434 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    6. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
    7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    8. Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2003. "Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 434-441, November.
    9. Ran Spiegler, 2017. "“Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1818-1841.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran & Thysen, Heidi C., 2021. "Strategic interpretations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-rational expectations; Archival information; Maximum entropy; Causal models; High-order beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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