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Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting

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  • Martin Osborne
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Martin Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2002. "Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000037, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000037
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David P. Myatt, 2002. "A New Theory of Strategic Voting [revised]," Economics Series Working Papers 93, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Osborne, Martin J & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Games with Procedurally Rational Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 834-847, September.
    3. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    4. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
    5. David P. Myatt, 2000. "The New Theory of Strategic Voting," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1586, Econometric Society.
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