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The choice of flexibility in targeting inflation during normal times and during disinflation

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  • Cukierman, Alex

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between the return path to price stability and the extent of flexibility in targeting inflation under perfect reputation as well as under imperfectly anchored inflation targeting systems characterized by imperfect reputation. The first part of the paper shows that the mapping from the flexibility parameter, to the return path to price stability is generally non-unique. It discusses reasons and consequences of this non-uniqueness, and proposes several ways to address the communication and related problems that this fact creates for the conduct of monetary policy. The second part investigates the impact of reputation (defined as the weight given by the public to preannounced interim targets in forming inflationary expectations) on the speed of inflation stabilization. The main result is that higher reputation is associated with faster stabilizations at all levels of the flexibility parameter.

Suggested Citation

  • Cukierman, Alex, 2015. "The choice of flexibility in targeting inflation during normal times and during disinflation," CEPR Discussion Papers 10827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Alex Cukierman, 2000. "Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 53-76, March.
    3. Alex Cukierman, 2009. "The Limits of Transparency," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 38(1‐2), pages 1-37, February.
    4. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Melnick, Rafi, 2015. "The Conquest of Israeli Inflation and Current Policy Dilemmas," CEPR Discussion Papers 10955, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1991. "Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 99-127, February.
    8. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2002. "Monetary policy and real stabilization," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 261-312.
    9. Orphanides, Athanasios, 2003. "Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 605-631, April.
    10. Walsh, Carl E, 2000. "Market Discipline and Monetary Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 249-271, April.
    11. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1989. "Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 121-184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2002. "Monetary policy and real stabilization," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 261-312.
    13. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2015. "New-Keynesian economics: An AS–AD view," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 503-524.
    14. Jordi Galí, 2008. "Introduction to Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework," Introductory Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press.
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    16. Smets, Frank, 2003. "Maintaining price stability: how long is the medium term?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1293-1309, September.
    17. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    18. Ms. Inci Ötker & Charles Freedman, 2009. "Country Experiences with the Introduction and Implementation of Inflation Targeting," IMF Working Papers 2009/161, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anchoring expectations; Reputation; Return to price stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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