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Discreet Commitments and Discretion of Policymakers with Private Information

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  • Elmar Mertens

    (Federal Reserve Board)

Abstract

Illustrated in a New Keynesian economy with time-varying output targets of the policymaker, belief management improves outcomes compared to symmetric information. At the margin, the policymaker tries to be intransparent about policy objectives by engineering disturbances which lower public beliefs about the persistence of output targets.

Suggested Citation

  • Elmar Mertens, 2010. "Discreet Commitments and Discretion of Policymakers with Private Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 763, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:763
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Christian Matthes & Argia M. Sbordone & Timothy Cogley, 2011. "Optimal Disinflation Under Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 74, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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