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Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale

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  • Patrick Artus

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[fre] Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale. . On se demande, dans des modèles posés en termes de jeux, ce que doit être la meilleure stratégie d'une Banque Centrale lorsqu'elle annonce un objectif de progression de la masse monétaire. Faut-il afficher un objectif bas, ce qui réduit les anticipations inflationnistes mais dégrade la réputation de la Banque Centrale ? Faut-il absolument respecter l'objectif affiché ? [eng] The choice of the intermediate monetary target and the reputation of the central bank. . In that paper, the strategic game between the Central Bank and the private sector is analyzed. The issue of the choice of the preannounced growth rate of money supply is adressed ; is it optimal for the Central Bank to choose a low intermediate monetary target, which reduces inflationnary expectations but may imply loss of reputation if money supply actually exceeds the target ?

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  • Patrick Artus, 1987. "Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(4), pages 807-836.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_4_409003
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    1. Pierre Cahuc, 1989. "Modes de formation des salaires et stagflation : une analyse en termes de théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(3), pages 421-440.

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