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Why are institutional transitions so difficult ?

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  • Boyer Robert
  • Orlean Andre

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  • Boyer Robert & Orlean Andre, 1991. "Why are institutional transitions so difficult ?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9139, CEPREMAP.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9139
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    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9139.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Reynaud Benedicte, 1991. "Règles d'équité dans la formation des salaires (les) : des études expérimentales aux formalisations économiques," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9111, CEPREMAP.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment may be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(4), pages 749-775.
    3. Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Relative Wages, Efficiency Wages, and Keynesian Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 383-388, May.
    4. David, Paul A, 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-337, May.
    5. Robert Boyer & André Orléan, 1991. "Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire : d'Henry Ford au fordisme," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(2), pages 233-272.
    6. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1982. "The Prisoners' Dilemma in the Invisible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 92-97, May.
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