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On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection

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  • Picard Pierre

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  • Picard Pierre, 1986. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8602, CEPREMAP.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8602
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    File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co8602.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    2. Baron, David P & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1980. "The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(5), pages 1115-1138, December.
    3. Martin L. Weitzman, 1976. "The New Soviet Incentive Model," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 251-257, Spring.
    4. Baron, D. P. & Holmström, B. R., 1980. "Abstract: The Investment Banking Contract for New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 851-851, November.
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