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Competition for leadership in teams

Author

Listed:
  • Mauleon, Ana

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

  • Schopohl, Simon
  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

We analyze a model of information centralization in teams where players can only exchange information through an endogenous network. Over several periods each player can either pass or not pass her information to her neighbors. Once one player has centralized all the information, all players receive some payoff. The winner who collects all the information gets an additional reward. Since each player discounts payoffs over time, she faces the dilemma of either letting another player centralizing all the information fast, or trying to collect all the information by herself and to overtake the leadership. We find that there is always a single winner who centralizes the information at equilibrium and we characterize the winner and the duration for any network and for any discount factor. We show that the star network is always pairwise stable. More surprisingly, we find that even networks in which the centralization takes a long time can be pairwise stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauleon, Ana & Schopohl, Simon & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2020. "Competition for leadership in teams," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3133, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:3133
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.026
    Note: In : Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Vol. 177, p. 19-33 (2020)
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    communication network; dynamic network game; information transmis- sion; leadership; pairwise stability; team project; war of attrition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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