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Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game

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  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude
  • DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe

Abstract

Oligopolistic competition is analyzed in a complete information multi-principal common agency framework, where principals are firms supplying differentiated goods and the agent is a representative consumer. We first propose a canonical formulation of common agency games, and a parameterization of the set of equilibria based on the Lagrange multipliers associated with the participation and the incentive compatibility constraints of each principal. This is used to characterize the set of equilibria in the intrinsic and non-intrinsic games. The former includes the latter, as well as the standard price and quantity equilibrium outcomes. It may also include the collusive solution.
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Suggested Citation

  • d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2010. "Oligopolistic competition as a common agency game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2238, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2238
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.025
    Note: In : Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1), 21-33, 2010
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    1. Claude d'Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira & Louis-André Gérard-Varet, 2007. "Competition For Market Share Or For Market Size: Oligopolistic Equilibria With Varying Competitive Toughness," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 761-784, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claude d’Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2016. "Oligopolistic vs. monopolistic competition: Do intersectoral effects matter?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 299-324, June.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2009. "Price-quantity competition with varying toughness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 62-82, January.
    3. d’Aspremont, Claude & Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe, 2017. "The Dixit–Stiglitz economy with a ‘small group’ of firms: A simple and robust equilibrium markup formula," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(4), pages 729-739.
    4. Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
    5. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca & Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2020. "Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    6. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    7. Horst, Ulrich & Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago, 2010. "Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-035, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    8. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    9. Saul DESIDERIO & Davide DOTTORI, 2007. "A note on competitive toughness: why it should be identified neither with product substitutability, nor (inversely) with concentration. Toward a unified theory of oligopoly," Working Papers 301, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

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