Competition, incomplete discrimination and versioning
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- Diaw, K. & Pouyet, J., 2004. "Competition, Incomplete Discrimination and Versioning," Other publications TiSEM cd19a654-fa53-4307-a7a4-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Competition, Incomplete Discrimination and Versioning," Working Papers 2004-20, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Diaw, K. & Pouyet, J., 2004. "Competition, Incomplete Discrimination and Versioning," Discussion Paper 2004-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Pouyet, Jérôme & Diaw, Khaled, 2004. "Competition, Incomplete Discrimination and Versioning," CEPR Discussion Papers 4589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Price competition; price discrimination; versioning;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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