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Forced saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes

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  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • De DONDER, Philippe
  • MALDONADO, Dario
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save "enough" for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.
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Suggested Citation

  • CREMER, Helmuth & De DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2009. "Forced saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2147, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2147
    DOI: 10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86
    Note: In : Southern Economic Journal, 76(1), 86-98, 2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pestieau, Pierre & Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Maldonado, Darío, 2008. "Habit Formation and Labour Supply," CEPR Discussion Papers 6776, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & De Donder, Philippe & Maldonado, Dario & Pestieau, Pierre, 2007. "Voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(10), pages 2041-2061, November.
    3. Sanna Tenhunen & Matti Tuomala, 2010. "On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 171-198, February.
    4. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2001. "Direct versus Indirect Taxation: The Design of the Tax Structure Revisted," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(3), pages 781-799, August.
    5. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2003. "Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2475-2490, October.
    6. Peter A. Diamond, 2005. "Taxation, Incomplete Markets, and Social Security," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262541823, April.
    7. Diamond, Peter & Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1839-1872, September.
    8. Martin Feldstein, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(2), pages 303-320.
    9. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, 2002. "Externalities and Optimal Taxation," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 14, pages 210-232, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Ayşe İmrohoroğlu & Selahattin İmrohoroğlu & Douglas H. Joines, 2003. "Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 745-784.
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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Jubilación Flexible
      by Sergi Jiménez in Nada Es Gratis on 2017-11-03 11:00:38

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    Cited by:

    1. Torben Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2011. "On myopia as rationale for social security," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 135-158, May.
    2. Moser, Christian & Olea de Souza e Silva, Pedro, 2019. "Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies," MPRA Paper 95383, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kerstin Roeder, 2014. "Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 597-618, March.
    4. Helmuth Cremer & Philippe Donder & Dario Maldonado & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(5), pages 547-562, October.
    5. Terhi Ravaska & Sanna Tenhunen & Matti Tuomala, 2016. "On the optimal lifetime redistribution and equality of opportunities," Working Papers 1600, Tampere University, Faculty of Management and Business, Economics.
    6. Frank N. Caliendo & T. Scott Findley, 2020. "Myopia, education, and social security," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(3), pages 694-720, June.
    7. Chu-chuan Cheng & Hsun Chu, 2018. "Optimal policies for sin goods and health care: Tax or subsidy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 412-429, April.
    8. Bagchi, Shantanu, 2015. "Labor supply and the optimality of Social Security," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 167-185.
    9. Sanna Tenhunen & Matti Tuomala, 2010. "On Optimal Lifetime Redistribution Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 171-198, February.
    10. Kerstin Roeder, 2009. "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents," Working Papers 2009/28, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    11. Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2013. "Long-term care policy, myopia and redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 33-43.
    12. Terhi Ravaska & Sanna Tenhunen & Matti Tuomala, 2018. "On the optimal lifetime redistribution and social objectives: a multidimensional approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 631-653, June.
    13. Erin Cottle Hunt & Frank N. Caliendo, 2022. "Social security and risk sharing: A survey of four decades of economic analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(5), pages 1591-1609, December.
    14. Frank Caliendo & Emin Gahramanov, 2013. "Myopia and pensions in general equilibrium," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 37(3), pages 375-401, July.
    15. Matti Tuomala & Sanna Tenhunen, 2013. "On the design of an optimal non-linear tax/pension system with habit formation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(3), pages 485-512, June.
    16. Lasse Frisgaard Gunnersen & Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, 2012. "Optimal Tax-Transfer Policies, Life-Cycle Labour Supply and Present-Biased Preferences," Economics Working Papers 2012-12, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    17. Cremer Helmuth & De Donder Philippe & Maldonado Dario & Pestieau Pierre, 2010. "Commodity Taxation under Habit Formation and Myopia," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-27, September.

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    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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