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Ideal efforts and consensus in a multi-layer network game

Author

Listed:
  • Mauleon, Ana

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

  • Nanumyan, Mariam

    (Bielefeld University)

  • Vannetelbosch, Vincent

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

Abstract

We study a network game on a fixed multi-layer network of two types of relationships. The social interactions in the first layer carries a pressure to conform with the social norm within the layer. The second layer provides additional strategic complementarities from players’ interaction. Players are endowed with personal ideal efforts and are heterogeneous in their ideal efforts and productivity. Each player repeatedly chooses her effort level in the network game and updates her ideal effort based on the new effort choice. Each player suffers disutility when her effort differs from her neighbors’ efforts or is inconsistent with her ideal effort. We find the pure Nash equilibrium of the game in each period and provide conditions for the convergence of efforts and ideals to a steady state. Furthermore, we provide conditions for emerging long-run consensus about ideals in groups of players and the entire network.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauleon, Ana & Nanumyan, Mariam & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2024. "Ideal efforts and consensus in a multi-layer network game," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2024023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2024023
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-layer networks ; network games ; personal norms ; social norms ; strategic complementarities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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