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Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game

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  • Dehez, Pierre

    (Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium)

  • Mêgnigbêto, Eustache

    (University of Antwerp)

Abstract

We generalize the 3-player game introduced by Mêgnigbêto (2018) to analyze the synergies existing between universities, the industry and the government in the Triple Helix, a model of research and innovation introduced by Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (1995). We consider situations involving any number of actors and we allow for a differentiation of their contributions. The resulting game has nonnegative Harsanyi dividends, implying its convexity. The relative size of the core measures the extent of the synergies and the Shapley value measures the contribution of each actor to these synergies.

Suggested Citation

  • Dehez, Pierre & Mêgnigbêto, Eustache, 2024. "Measuring the extent of synergies among innovation actors and their contributions: the Helix as a cooperative game," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2024006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2024006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kar, Anirban & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2009. "On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 16-25, January.
    2. Loet Leydesdorff, 2003. "The mutual information of university-industry-government relations: An indicator of the Triple Helix dynamics," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 58(2), pages 445-467, October.
    3. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, 2007. "Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments," Working Papers wp2007_0702, CEMFI.
    5. Dehez Pierre & Poukens Sophie, 2014. "The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 265-284, November.
    6. Zhao, Jingang, 2018. "Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 592-599.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dehez, Pierre & Ferey, Samuel, 2024. "Leniency in antitrust investigations as a cooperative game," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2024008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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