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Incertidumbre y riesgo en los cobros desde el punto penal: un análisis aplicando la teoría de juegos

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  • Alexander Cotte Poveda
  • Julian Gutierrez López

Abstract

La incertidumbre y el riesgo juegan un papel preponderante en el momento de tomar la decisión de cobrar un tiro desde el punto penal. Las implicaciones de ganar un torneo de fútbol de alta competencia tienen efectos de senalización sobre los agentes que participan en los diferentes mercados. Este trabajo de investigación advierte que los cobros desde el punto penal no son una simple cuestión de azar y suerte, es una interacción que debe tener en cuenta entre otras muchas variables no solo la técnica, la preparación, las dotaciones de los participantes sino que debe ser una combinación de estrategias y probabilidades. Aplicando la Teoría de Juegos para los tres equipos más representativos de la liga de fútbol de Espana, – Real Madrid, Barcelona y el Atlético de Madrid – y utilizando los datos de la Primera División de Espana, Copa del Rey, Mundial de Clubes y la Champions League, todas estas competiciones correspondientes a la Temporada 2015-16 y Temporada 2014-15, se determinan las distintas estrategias y probabilidades que el cobrador debe dilucidar para anotar el gol en un cobro desde el punto penal y con ello contrarrestar las diferentes probabilidades y estrategias de las que dispone el arquero para atajar el lanzamiento.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Cotte Poveda & Julian Gutierrez López, 2015. "Incertidumbre y riesgo en los cobros desde el punto penal: un análisis aplicando la teoría de juegos," Serie de Documentos en Economía y Violencia 16606, Centro de Investigaciones en Violencia, Instituciones y Desarrollo Económico (VIDE).
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000137:016606
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microeconomía; Teoría de Juegos; Incertidumbre y Riesgo; Modelos de Programación.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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