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Colombia: la percepción de justicia distributiva y la demanda política por estabilidad macroeconómica

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  • Eduardo Wiesner

Abstract

El presente artículo integra tres planteamientos interdependientes sobre la economía política de la problemática macroeconómica de Colombia. Primero, que desde la Constitución de 1991 se creó un desequilibrio estructural en el frente fiscal entre los ingresos y los gastos públicos. Esto explica gran parte de la volatilidad macroeconómica que se ha presentado en las dos últimas décadas. El segundo, que el creciente gasto social con ánimo redistributivo es realmente regresivo en gran medida y, por fallas de información al respecto, la demanda política por reformas que concilien la redistribución con la sostenibilidad fiscal termina siendo muy débil. En tercer lugar, y como estrategia de reforma, habría que fortalecer aún más las instituciones macroeconómicas y contemplar la creación de un Consejo Fiscal Superior análogo al Banco de la República en sus características de independencia técnica y de responsabilidad política.

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  • Eduardo Wiesner, 2011. "Colombia: la percepción de justicia distributiva y la demanda política por estabilidad macroeconómica," Documentos CEDE 8739, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:008739
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    equidad; justicia distributiva; demanda política; déficit fiscal; información.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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