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Attitudes and attributes: a field experiment with public officials and transfer recipients In Colombia

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  • Juan Camilo Cárdenas
  • Rajiv Sethi

Abstract

Any system of transfer payments must be administered by officials with some degree of discretionary power over the manner in which funds are allocated. Attitudes of such officials regarding the worthiness of various recipients therefore have implications for resource allocation. Using a sample of actual public servants working in education, health, child care and nutrition programs, and a sample of potential and actual beneficiaries of such programs, we attempt to identify the set of recipient attributes that induce the most generous responses from officials. This is done using a design we call the distributive dictator game" which requires officials to rank recipients, with the understanding that a higher ranking corresponds to an increased likelihood of getting a voucher convertible into cash. Interpreting the ranking as the outcome of a random utility model, we estimate the effects of recipient attributes using a rank-order logistic regression. We find that public officials tend to favor women, married persons, individuals with many minor dependents, and refugees from political violence. "

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Rajiv Sethi, 2007. "Attitudes and attributes: a field experiment with public officials and transfer recipients In Colombia," Documentos CEDE 6881, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:006881
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public officials; transfer recipients; field experiments; rank-order logistic regression.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General

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