IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002070.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Budget Inflexibility

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Carlos Echeverry
  • Leopoldo Fergusson
  • Pablo Querubín

Abstract

The study of budgetary institutions has long been an important topic in the economic literature. Nonetheless, the degree of rigidity or inflexibility in budget preparation, a prime preoccupation for policy makers and in particular for finance ministers since a long time ago, has been relatively unexplored. In this paper we show that budget inflexibility can take several forms and argue that it is likely to be closely related to various types of political conflict present in the budget process. Moreover, we study one particular form of budget inflexibility and its connection with one specific (but perhaps the most important) political force driving the budget process. More specifically, we discuss some of the consequences of "expenditure inflexibility," defined as the existence of transfers to special interests enjoying constitutional or legal protection which impede their modification in the short run, in a simple model of legislative bargaining that captures the Tragedy of the Commons present in public budget allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubín, 2005. "Budget Inflexibility," Documentos CEDE 2070, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:002070
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/7960/dcede2005-52.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Torsten Persson, 2002. "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 883-905, May.
    2. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447.
    3. Martin Feldstein, 2002. "The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment," NBER Working Papers 9203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    5. Alan J. Auerbach, 2002. "Is there a role for discretionary fiscal policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 109-150.
    6. Bizer, David S. & Durlauf, Steven N., 1990. "Testing the positive theory of government finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 123-141, August.
    7. Charles Wyplosz, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules," IHEID Working Papers 03-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    8. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andres, 1995. "Money-Based Versus Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization with Endogenous Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 95-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    9. Janice Bell, 2001. "The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Communist Poland," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1810.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    11. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
    12. Hana Polackova Brixi & Allen Schick, 2002. "Government at Risk : Contingent Liabilities and Fiscal Risk," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15233.
    13. Andres Velasco & Alejandro Neut, 2003. "Tough Policies, Incredible Policies?," NBER Working Papers 9932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
    15. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Anoop Singh & Mr. Martin D. Cerisola, 2006. "Sustaining Latin America's Resurgence: Some Historical Perspectives," IMF Working Papers 2006/252, International Monetary Fund.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Leopoldo Fergusson & Pablo Querubin, 2004. "La Batalla Política Por El Presupuesto De La Nación: Inflexibilidades O Supervivencia Fiscal," Documentos CEDE 2944, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales Y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Los Casos De Argentina, Colombia, México Y Perú," Documentos CEDE 3475, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Echeverry, Juan Carlos & Bonilla, Jorge Alexander & Moya, Andrés, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 2303, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 9091, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Andres Velasco, 1997. "Debts and Deficits with Fragmented Fiscal Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 6286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Ignacio Lozano & Hernán Rincón & Miguel Sarmiento & Jorge Ramos, 2008. "Regla fiscal cuantitativa para consolidar y blindar las finanzas públicas de Colombia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(19), pages 311-352, July-Dece.
    7. Michał Mackiewicz, 2006. "Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-22.
    8. repec:ers:journl:v:vi:y:2018:i:3:p:98-114 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    10. Velasco, Andres, 2000. "Debts and deficits with fragmented fiscal policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 105-125, April.
    11. Eduardo Wiesner, 2008. "The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy Reform in Latin America," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12913.
    12. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    13. Andres Velasco, 1999. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 37-58, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Mr. Anthony M Annett, 2002. "Politics, Government Size, and Fiscal Adjustment in Industrial Countries," IMF Working Papers 2002/162, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Asma Arif & Mujahid Hussain, 2018. "The Role of Governance and Political institutions for Budget Deficit for Low and High Income Countries: A Panel Data Analysis," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(Special 3), pages 357-366.
    16. Asma Arif & Mujahid Hussain, 2018. "Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Budget Deficits Volatility: A Panel Data Analysis," International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), International Journal of Economics & Business Administration (IJEBA), vol. 0(3), pages 98-114.
    17. Ziogas, Thanasis & Panagiotidis, Theodore, 2021. "Revisiting the political economy of fiscal adjustments," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    18. Falilou Fall & Debra Bloch & Jean-Marc Fournier & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks," OECD Economic Policy Papers 15, OECD Publishing.
    19. Simon Berset & Martin Huber & Mark Schelker, 2023. "The fiscal response to revenue shocks," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(3), pages 814-848, June.
    20. Miguel Braun & Luciano di Gresia, 2003. "Hacia un sistema de seguro social eficaz en América Latina: la importancia de una política fiscal anticíclica," Research Department Publications 4334, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    21. Campos, Ed & Pradhan, Sanjay, 1996. "Budgetary institutions and expenditure outcomes : binding governments to fiscal performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1646, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Colombia; Fiscal Policy; Budget; Inflexibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:col:000089:002070. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Universidad De Los Andes-Cede (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceandco.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.