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Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott

Abstract

Auditing is introduced into a model of bank capital regulation. Deterministic and stochastic auditing strategies are studied. Contrary to intuition, auditing of bank risk should be focused on the safest banks because they hold the least amount of capital. Risky banks, which hold more capital, need to be audited less. The importance of auditing by regulators and penalties for non-compliance are discussed in light of the Basel II capital regulation proposals. Emphasis is placed on the importance of supervisory review - Pillar Two of Basel II - of the accuracy of banks' reports on the risk of their assets.

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  • Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation," Working Papers wp2004_0412, CEMFI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2004_0412
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lacker, Jeffrey M & Weinberg, John A, 1989. "Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1345-1363, December.
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    7. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2001. "Bank capital regulation with and without state-contingent penalties," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 139-184, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
    2. Marshall, David A. & Prescott, Edward Simpson, 2006. "State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2015-2049, November.
    3. Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009. "On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy," MPRA Paper 16836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Yaron Leitner & Bilge Yilmaz, 2016. "Regulating A Model," Working Papers 16-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Blum, Jürg M., 2008. "Why 'Basel II' may need a leverage ratio restriction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1699-1707, August.
    6. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Beverly Hirtle & David O. Lucca, 2016. "Parsing the content of bank supervision," Staff Reports 770, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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