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Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance

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  • Bruce Smith
  • Cheng Wang

Abstract

We consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs. The insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level. We characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents. We then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance. Our results suggest - in a deposit insurance context - that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on, and to make deposit insurance payments only later, or not at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Smith & Cheng Wang, 1997. "Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance," Working Papers 574, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmwp:574
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 1997. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 72-105, September.
    2. Yi Jin & Charles K.Y. Leung & Zhixiong Zeng, 2012. "Real Estate, the External Finance Premium and Business Investment: A Quantitative Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 40(1), pages 167-195, March.
    3. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2005. "Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 867-885, November.
    4. Ilhyock Shim, 2011. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(8), pages 1625-1661, December.
    5. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2005. "Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 867-885, November.
    6. Jain, N. & Imai, S., 2015. "Dynamic Costly State Verification with Repeated Loans: a two-period analysis," Working Papers 13889, Department of Economics, City University London.
    7. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015. "Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
    8. Kocherlakota Narayana R, 2001. "Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-20, February.
    9. Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Smith, Bruce D. & Yip, Chong K., 2002. "Monetary Policy and Government Credit Programs," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 232-268, July.
    10. Boyd, John H. & Smith, Bruce D., 1999. "The Use of Debt and Equity in Optimal Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 270-316, October.
    11. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing and Bank Capital Regulation," Working Papers wp2004_0412, CEMFI.

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