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Asymmetric information, option to wait to invest and the optimal level of investment

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  • Lensink, Robert
  • Sterken, Elmer

Abstract

This paper analyzes equilibrium rationing on credit markets in the case of gains from waiting to acquire information about the future profitability of investment. We compare the competitive outcome with the socially optimal level of investment. We show that the opportunity to postpone investment changes the nature of the inefficiencies of the competitive outcome fundamentally. Without the option to wait, high risk firms tend to invest and the outcome is characterized by a situation of underinvestment. If firms can wait high risk firms benefit the most from waiting. In this case low risk firms tend to invest immediately and a situation of overinvestment will result, since from the banks' point of view firms do not delay enough.
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  • Lensink, Robert & Sterken, Elmer, 2001. "Asymmetric information, option to wait to invest and the optimal level of investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 365-374, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:79:y:2001:i:2:p:365-374
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    4. Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 2003. "Structural modelling of financial constraints on investment: where do we stand?," Chapters, in: Paul Butzen & Catherine Fuss (ed.), Firms’ Investment and Finance Decisions, chapter 2, pages 40-58, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Paolo M. Panteghini, 2002. "On Debt Financing and Investment Timing," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 110-114, Autumn.
    6. Caren Sureth, 2002. "Partially Irreversible Investment Decisions and Taxation under Uncertainty: A Real Option Approach," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(2), pages 185-221, May.
    7. Niemann Rainer & Sureth Caren, 2005. "Capital Budgeting with Taxes under Uncertainty and Irreversibility / Investitionsplanung mit Steuern bei Unsicherheit und Irreversibilität," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 225(1), pages 77-95, February.
    8. Temesgen Belissa & Robert Lensink & Anne Winkel, 2020. "Effects of Index Insurance on Demand and Supply of Credit: Evidence from Ethiopia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(5), pages 1511-1531, October.
    9. Aktham Maghyereh, 2005. "Dynamic Capital Structure: Evidence From The Small Developing Country Of Jordan," IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, IIUM Journal of Economis and Management, vol. 13(1), pages 1-32, June.

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