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Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies

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  • Yuval Emek
  • Michal Feldman

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  • Yuval Emek & Michal Feldman, 2007. "Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000184, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eyal Winter, 2004. "Incentives and Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 764-773, June.
    2. Nisan, Noam & Ronen, Amir, 2001. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 166-196, April.
    3. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611.
    4. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    5. Roland Strausz, "undated". "Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams," Papers 001, Departmental Working Papers.
    6. Babaioff, Moshe & Feldman, Michal & Nisan, Noam & Winter, Eyal, 2012. "Combinatorial agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 999-1034.
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