IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/618897000000001035.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Kjell Hausken

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000001035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/jh_kh.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hirshleifer, Jack & Osborne, Evan, 2001. "Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 169-195, July.
    2. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
    3. John G. Riley, 2002. "Weak and Strong Signals," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 213-236, June.
    4. Kjell Hausken & Jack Hirshleifer, 2002. "The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis An Economic Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 825, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. repec:bla:scandj:v:104:y:2002:i:2:p:213-36 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Riley, John G., 1975. "Competitive signalling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 174-186, April.
    9. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    10. Karl–Gustaf Lofgren & Torsten Persson & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2002. "Markets with Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 195-211, June.
    11. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
    12. Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Costly Signaling and Cooperation," Working Papers 00-12-071, Santa Fe Institute.
    13. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    14. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lupton, Sylvie, 2006. "Il était une fois la qualité," MPRA Paper 5, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Wei Zhang, 2014. "Job Market Signalling With Two Dimensions Of Private Information," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 113-132, April.
    3. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    4. Karsten Mause, 2009. "Too Much Competition in Higher Education? Some Conceptual Remarks on the Excessive‐Signaling Hypothesis," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(5), pages 1107-1133, November.
    5. Panle Jia Barwick & Yanyan Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Qi Wu, 2023. "Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1170-1207, May.
    6. Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2017. "Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 75-98, June.
    7. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2021. "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers 21-1201, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
    8. Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
    9. Weng, Xi & Wu, Fan & Yin, Xundong, 2023. "Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    10. Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 14063, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Learning Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.06, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
    12. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    13. Naiditch, Claire & Vranceanu, Radu, 2011. "Remittances as a social status signaling device," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 305-318, December.
    14. De Feo, Giuseppe & Hindriks, Jean, 2014. "Harmful competition in insurance markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 213-226.
    15. He, Haoran & Wu, Keyu, 2016. "Choice set, relative income, and inequity aversion: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 177-193.
    16. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    17. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    18. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    19. Timothy Perri, 2016. "Does signalling solve the lemons problem?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 227-229, March.
    20. repec:cte:werepe:we081207 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Gunay, Samet, 2020. "Seeking causality between liquidity risk and credit risk: TED-OIS spreads and CDS indexes," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000001035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David K. Levine (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.