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Weak and Strong Signals

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  • John G. Riley

Abstract

Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz showed that competitive markets can perform very poorly in the presence of informational asymmetry. In this paper I show that if there is a signaling technology which is sufficiently strong (i.e., the marginal cost of signaling declines sufficiently rapidly with quality) the cost of sorting is low and a Nash equilibrium exists. Empirically testable necessary and sufficient conditions for existence are derived. I further show that if Akerlovian participation constraints are added to a signaling model there is a minimum signaling threshold. Finally I argue that these conclusions hold regardless of whether it is the uninformed or informed agents who move first. JEL classification: D8

Suggested Citation

  • John G. Riley, 2002. "Weak and Strong Signals," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 213-236, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:104:y:2002:i:2:p:213-236
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00281
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Parker & Mirjam van Praag, 2004. "Schooling, Capital Constraints and Entrepreneurial Performance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-106/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 07 Mar 2005.
    2. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, "undated". "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Working Papers 620, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Aidis, Ruta & van Praag, Mirjam, 2007. "Illegal entrepreneurship experience: Does it make a difference for business performance and motivation?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 283-310, March.
    4. Mirjam van Praag & Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Justin van der Sluis, 2009. "Returns for Entrepreneurs versus Employees: The Effect of Education and Personal Control on the Relative Performance of Entrepreneurs vis-a-vis Wage Employees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-111/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    5. Joern H. Block & Lennart Hoogerheide & Roy Thurik, 2010. "Are Education and Entrepreneurial Income Endogenous and do Family Background Variables make Sense as Instruments? A Bayesian Analysis," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-024/4, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Block Joern H. & Hoogerheide Lennart & Thurik Roy, 2012. "Are Education and Entrepreneurial Income Endogenous? A Bayesian Analysis," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-29, July.
    7. Karsten Mause, 2009. "Too Much Competition in Higher Education? Some Conceptual Remarks on the Excessive‐Signaling Hypothesis," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(5), pages 1107-1133, November.
    8. van Praag, Mirjam C. & van Witteloostuijn, Arjen & van der Sluis, Justin, 2009. "Returns for Entrepreneurs vs. Employees: The Effect of Education and Personal Control on the Relative Performance of Entrepreneurs vs. Wage Employees," IZA Discussion Papers 4628, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Habermalz, Steffen, 2003. "Job Matching and the Returns to Educational Signals," IZA Discussion Papers 726, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Justin Van Der Sluis & Mirjam Van Praag & Wim Vijverberg, 2008. "Education And Entrepreneurship Selection And Performance: A Review Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 795-841, December.
    11. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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