Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss: Their Impact on Risk
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Cited by:
- Machina, Mark J, 2001.
"Payoff Kinks in Preferences over Lotteries,"
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-260, November.
- Machina, Mark J, 2000. "Payoff Kinks in Preferences Over Lotteries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7vn7d2hs, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Boyer, Marcel & Dionne, Georges, 1983.
"Riscophobie et étalement à moyenne constante : analyse et applications,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 59(2), pages 208-229, juin.
- Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1982. "Riscophobie et Etalement a Moyenne Constante: Analyse et Applications," Cahiers de recherche 8229, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Boyer, Marcel & Dionne, Georges, 1984.
"Sécurité routière : efficacité, subvention et réglementation,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 60(2), pages 200-222, juin.
- Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1983. "Securite Routiere: Efficacite, Subvention et Reglementation," Cahiers de recherche 8317, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Boyer, Marcel & Kotchoni, Rachidi & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, 2015.
"Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 38-47.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Rachidi Kotchoni, 2013. "Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-24, CIRANO.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2014. "Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence From the European Union," Post-Print hal-01386062, HAL.
- Ozlem Ozdemir, 2007. "Valuation of Self-Insurance and Self-Protection under Ambiguity: Experimental Evidence," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice & Treich, Nicolas, 2013.
"Prevention and precaution,"
TSE Working Papers
13-445, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "Prevention and precaution," IDEI Working Papers 805, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Carel Vachon, 1999. "Dealing with Major Technological Risks," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-29, CIRANO.
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