IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cfe/wpcefa/2021_2022.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Lessons from the Portuguese Carnations Revolution of 1974 by a game theory approach

Author

Listed:
  • Vanessa de Sousa Duarte

    (CEFAGE)

  • Miguel Rocha de Sousa

    (Department of Economics; Center for Research in Advanced Studies in Management and Economics (CEFAGE); Research Center in Political Science (CICP); Universidade de Évora, Portugal)

Abstract

Resumo: This paper analyses the Portuguese Carnations Revolution by a perspective of Game Theory. It concludes that the Democratization and the Decolonization Games achieved the expected Nash equilibrium in a relatively short period of time, whereas it took a longer period to achieve it on the Development Game. The players are the ruler (R), the people (P), the colonies (C) and the market (M). The 3Ds games are the MFAÂ’s motto: Democratization (D1), Decolonization(D2) and Development (D3) games. We present the game between the four players in the normal form. Each player can choose between (Di; NDi), for each i=1,2,3. The tentative conclusion is to see how AprilÂ’s Carnations Revolution is the result of a pure three strategy Nash equilibria, among the four players. For the first tentative effort in modelling we assume perfect information. The results are consistent with the fact that playing 3Ds all players abiding by the rule (D1, D2, D3), and thus MFAÂ’s motto is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. A new optimal out of equilibrium historical counterfactual short analysis is done, and tries to provide and lay the foundations for a new economic historical method.

Suggested Citation

  • Vanessa de Sousa Duarte & Miguel Rocha de Sousa, 2021. "Lessons from the Portuguese Carnations Revolution of 1974 by a game theory approach," CEFAGE-UE Working Papers 2021_2022, University of Evora, CEFAGE-UE (Portugal).
    • Handle: RePEc:cfe:wpcefa:2021_2022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://api.cefage.uevora.pt/assets/5622fa0f-c4cd-476c-9a3c-37ab372b80c4
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. ROBERT H. BATES & RUI J. P. De FIGUEIREDO Jr. & BARRY R. WEINGAST, 1998. "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition," Politics & Society, , vol. 26(2), pages 221-256, June.
    2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    3. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    4. Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October.
    5. Stalnaker, Robert, 1996. "Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 133-163, October.
    6. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(3), pages 427-460, July.
    7. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, December.
    8. Ken Binmore, 1994. "Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 1: Playing Fair," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262023636, December.
    9. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 86, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Giacomo Bonanno, 2008. "Non-cooperative game theory," Working Papers 159, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma," Working Papers 6, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    7. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 318-343, July.
    8. Michael Vlerick, 2020. "Towards Global Cooperation: The Case for a Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(3), pages 305-314, May.
    9. Timothy Besley, 2020. "State Capacity, Reciprocity, and the Social Contract," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1307-1335, July.
    10. Johan Van Benthem & Eric Pacuit & Olivier Roy, 2011. "Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, February.
    11. Giacomo Bonanno, 2013. "Counterfactuals and the Prisoner?s Dilemma," Working Papers 137, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    12. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Paper 244, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2002.
    13. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    14. Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
    15. Graciela Kuechle, 2009. "What Happened To The Three‐Legged Centipede Game?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 562-585, July.
    16. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    17. Louis Corriveau, 2012. "Game theory and the kula," Rationality and Society, , vol. 24(1), pages 106-128, February.
    18. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    19. Ley, Eduardo, 2006. "Statistical inference as a bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 142-149, October.
    20. Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 11, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cfe:wpcefa:2021_2022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Angela Pacheco (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cfevopt.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.