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Towards Global Cooperation: The Case for a Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly

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  • Michael Vlerick

Abstract

In an important article published in this journal, Dryzek et al. (2011) champion the convocation of a deliberative global citizens' assembly (DGCA). In this article, I aim to further strengthen the case for a DGCA by addressing: (1) why a DGCA is likely to take a long‐term perspective in the global interest; and (2) why it is so vital that a global institution should do so. I start by analyzing the nature of the issues requiring global policy. These issues, I will argue, are typically global cooperation problems. Cooperation problems pose two major challenges. The first is to prevent freeriding, that is, serving one's immediate interests at the expense of the global interest. The second is to align on an efficient global policy. In both respects, I will argue, a DGCA is a good candidate to yield desirable results (and is likely to do better than current supranational institutions).

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Vlerick, 2020. "Towards Global Cooperation: The Case for a Deliberative Global Citizens' Assembly," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(3), pages 305-314, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:glopol:v:11:y:2020:i:3:p:305-314
    DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12785
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    Cited by:

    1. Tasneem Siddiqui & Lucy Szaboova & W. Neil Adger & Ricardo Safra de Campos & Mohammad Rashed Alam Bhuiyan & Tamim Billah, 2021. "Policy Opportunities and Constraints for Addressing Urban Precarity of Migrant Populations," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(S2), pages 91-105, April.
    2. John S. Dryzek & Simon J. Niemeyer, 2024. "How to constitute global citizens' forums: Key selection principles," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 15(4), pages 604-614, September.

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