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Autonomous Vehicles: Moral Dilemmas and Adoption Incentives

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  • Eberhard Feess
  • Gerd Muehlheusser

Abstract

In unavoidable traffic accidents, autonomous vehicles (AVs) face the dilemma of protecting either the passenger(s) or third parties. Recent studies show that most people prefer AVs following a utilitarian approach by minimizing total harm. At the same time, however, they would adopt an AV only if it prioritizes the passenger(s), i.e. themselves. As AVs exhibit a lower accident risk in the first place, a regulator therefore faces a trade-off: the harm-minimizing behavior of AVs (ex post efficiency) hampers the willingness to adopt them (ex ante efficiency). Using a game-theoretic model, we analyze how the second-best optimal level of AV passenger protection depends on (i) the AV safety advantage, (ii) the intensity of drivers’ social preferences, and (iii) their reluctance to adopt AVs. A higher AV safety advantage may either increase or decrease the second best optimal level of passenger protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Eberhard Feess & Gerd Muehlheusser, 2022. "Autonomous Vehicles: Moral Dilemmas and Adoption Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 9825, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9825
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    autonomous vehicles; ethical dilemma; trolley problem; adoption of new technologies; game theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L62 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment; Related Parts and Equipment
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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