IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6685.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes

Author

Listed:
  • Christoph Laica
  • Arne Lauber
  • Marco Sahm

Abstract

We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes. With three symmetric players and two prizes, the tournament is completely fair if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize, regardless of whether matches are organized as Tullock contests or as allpay auctions. For second prizes different from half of the first prize, three-player tournaments with matches organized as Tullock contests are usually fairer than tournaments with matches organized as all-pay auctions. However, unless the second prize is very small, they are less intense in the sense that players exert less ex-ante expected aggregate effort per unit of prize money. Moreover, we specify how the relative size of the second prize influences the extent and the direction of discrimination as well as the intensity of three-player tournaments. Finally, we show that there is no prize structure for which sequential round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players are completely fair in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Laica & Arne Lauber & Marco Sahm, 2017. "Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes," CESifo Working Paper Series 6685, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6685
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6685.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    2. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
    3. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    4. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2020. "The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 379-396, June.
    5. Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?," BERG Working Paper Series 121, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    6. Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168113, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    8. Krumer, Alex & Lechner, Michael, 2016. "First In First Win: Evidence on Unfairness of Round-Robin Tournaments in Mega-Events," Economics Working Paper Series 1611, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    9. Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022. "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 525-583, October.
    10. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2017. "First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 633-658, March.
    11. Marco Sahm, 2017. "Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6421, CESifo.
    12. Krumer, Alex & Lechner, Michael, 2017. "First in first win: Evidence on schedule effects in round-robin tournaments in mega-events," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 412-427.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christoph March & Marco Sahm, 2019. "The Perks of Being in the Smaller Team: Incentives in Overlapping Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7994, CESifo.
    2. Philipp Mundt & Simone Alfarano & Mishael Milaković, 2022. "Survival and the Ergodicity of Corporate Profitability," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3726-3734, May.
    3. Proaño, Christian R. & Lojak, Benjamin, 2020. "Animal spirits, risk premia and monetary policy at the zero lower bound," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 221-233.
    4. Deren Çağlayan & Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2022. "Effort comparisons for a class of four-player tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 119-137, July.
    5. Arata, Yoshiyuki & Mundt, Philipp, 2019. "Topology and formation of production input interlinkages: Evidence from Japanese microdata," BERG Working Paper Series 152, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    6. Martin Carolin & Westerhoff Frank, 2019. "Regulating Speculative Housing Markets via Public Housing Construction Programs: Insights from a Heterogeneous Agent Model," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 239(4), pages 627-660, August.
    7. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep, 2019. "Managing unanchored, heterogeneous expectations and liquidity traps," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-16.
    8. Christian Deutscher & Marco Sahm & Sandra Schneemann & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2019. "Strategic Investment Decisions in Multi-stage Contests with Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 7474, CESifo.
    9. Lustenhouwer, Joep & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2017. "Fiscal consolidations and finite planning horizons," BERG Working Paper Series 130, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    10. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2018. "Fiscal consolidations and heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 173-205.
    11. Mundt, Philipp & Oh, Ilfan, 2019. "Asymmetric competition, risk, and return distribution," BERG Working Paper Series 145, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    12. Roberto Dieci & Noemi Schmitt & Frank Westerhoff, 2018. "Steady states, stability and bifurcations in multi-asset market models," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 41(2), pages 357-378, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dmitry Dagaev & Andrey Zubanov, 2022. "Round-robin tournaments with limited resources," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 525-583, October.
    2. Laica, Christoph & Lauber, Arne & Sahm, Marco, 2021. "Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 421-448.
    3. Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?," BERG Working Paper Series 121, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    4. Marco Sahm, 2017. "Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6421, CESifo.
    5. Lauber, Arne & March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2023. "Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 30-51.
    6. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
    7. Sahm, Marco, 2017. "Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168113, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
    9. Krumer, Alex & Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2023. "Strategic manipulations in round-robin tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 50-57.
    10. Cédric Wasser, 2013. "Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 239-268, May.
    11. Alex Krumer & Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2020. "The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 379-396, June.
    12. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
    13. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    14. Zhang, Ming & Wang, Guanghui & Xu, Jin & Qu, Cunquan, 2020. "Dynamic contest model with bounded rationality," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 370(C).
    15. Christian Deutscher & Marco Sahm & Sandra Schneemann & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2022. "Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 281-317, September.
    16. Cedric Duvinage & Peter-J. Jost, 2019. "The Role of Referees in Professional Sports Contests," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 20(8), pages 1014-1050, December.
    17. Christian Deutscher & Marco Sahm & Sandra Schneemann & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2019. "Strategic Investment Decisions in Multi-stage Contests with Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 7474, CESifo.
    18. Martin Carolin & Westerhoff Frank, 2019. "Regulating Speculative Housing Markets via Public Housing Construction Programs: Insights from a Heterogeneous Agent Model," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 239(4), pages 627-660, August.
    19. Hommes, Cars & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2018. "Fiscal consolidations and heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 173-205.
    20. Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013. "Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    round-robin tournament; multiple prizes; fairness; intensity; Tullock contest; all-pay auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6685. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.