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On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education

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  • Panu Poutvaara

Abstract

This paper proposes and analyzes a model of a “European economy” with three overlapping generations, redistributive social security, and public universities without tuition. Individuals differ ex ante. The effect of wage tax rate on occupational choice and the voting equilibrium of wage tax rate and educational investments are analyzed both under full certainty and with income risks facing the educated and the uneducated.

Suggested Citation

  • Panu Poutvaara, 2001. "On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education," CESifo Working Paper Series 424, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_424
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Education; social security; redistributive taxation; occupational choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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