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Does Honesty Respond to Unrelated Luck?

Author

Listed:
  • Diogo Geraldes
  • Franziska Heinicke
  • Duk Gyoo Kim

Abstract

We conducted a lab experiment to examine (1) whether luck-based income influences honesty in a subsequent, unrelated decision, (2) whether the perceived agency over an uncertain event affects the interplay between luck and honesty, and (3) whether accumulated previous luck-based incomes influence honesty. Specifically, participants self-report a dice roll outcome after receiving an unrelated luck-based income. Additionally, we manipulated participants’ perceived control over the luck-based income. In the exogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses determine the luck-based income. In the endogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses also determine the luck-based income, but the participants choose the coin’s winning side beforehand. Our main findings are as follows: lying behavior increases when contemporaneous luck-based income is high, remains unaffected by perceived agency, and does not correlate with prior luck-based income. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that individual-specific heterogeneity may significantly influence dishonesty, contrasting with the common view that context is the primary driver.

Suggested Citation

  • Diogo Geraldes & Franziska Heinicke & Duk Gyoo Kim, 2024. "Does Honesty Respond to Unrelated Luck?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11602, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11602
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    laboratory experiment; lying; luck; honesty; agency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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