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Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment

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  • Radu Vranceanu
  • Fouad El Ouardighi
  • Delphine Dubart

Abstract

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing for punishment in a real‐effort pair production experiment. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs on whether he or she can impose a sanction on the less performing partner. When sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a sanction mechanism allows good performers to focus on their own performance. In the case of costless sanctions, not sanctioning a partner who under‐performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his or her performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger push effect. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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  • Radu Vranceanu & Fouad El Ouardighi & Delphine Dubart, 2015. "Team Production with Punishment Option: Insights from a Real‐Effort Experiment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(6), pages 408-420, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:36:y:2015:i:6:p:408-420
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    Cited by:

    1. SeEun Jung & Radu Vranceanu, 2017. "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 95-126.
    2. Diogo Geraldes & Franziska Heinicke & Duk Gyoo Kim, 2022. "The Effect of Chosen or Given Luck on Honesty," CESifo Working Paper Series 9904, CESifo.
    3. Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2022. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 93-107, July.
    4. Chadi, Adrian & Homolka, Konstantin, 2022. "Little Lies and Blind Eyes – Experimental Evidence on Cheating and Task Performance in Work Groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 199(C), pages 122-159.
    5. Omolbanin Jalali & Zahra Nasrollahi & Madjid Hatefi Madjumerd, 2019. "An Experimental Study of Incentive Reversal in Sequential and Simultaneous Games," Iranian Economic Review (IER), Faculty of Economics,University of Tehran.Tehran,Iran, vol. 23(3), pages 639-658, Summer.
    6. Benndorf, Volker & Rau, Holger A. & Sölch, Christian, 2018. "Minimizing learning behavior in repeated real-effort tasks," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 343, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    7. James Fan & Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, 2020. "Nonbinding Goals in Teams: A Real Effort Coordination Experiment," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(5), pages 1026-1044, September.
    8. Sonntag, Axel & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2017. "Accountability one step removed," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168235, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Benndorf, Volker & Rau, Holger A. & Sölch, Christian, 2019. "Minimizing learning in repeated real-effort tasks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 239-248.

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