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Bureaucratic Frictions and Innovation Procurement

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  • Leonardo M. Giuffrida
  • Emilio Raiteri

Abstract

Is work overload a friction to public agencies? Using data on R&D procurements, patents, and contracting units from a US federal agency, we investigate how officer workload impacts innovation procurement outcomes. Unanticipated retirement shifts provide an exogenous source of variation that we exploit as an instrument for workload. When workload declines, we find a significant increase in patent rates. One additional officer leads to a 28 percent increase in the probability that a contract will generate a patent. Our findings suggest that officers burdened with excessive workloads may not provide adequate guidance to R&D suppliers when it is most needed.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Emilio Raiteri, 2023. "Bureaucratic Frictions and Innovation Procurement," CESifo Working Paper Series 10775, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10775
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    workload; procurement; bureaucrats; R&D; patents; instrumental variable;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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