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La Economía de los Trasplantes de Organos: Los Incentivos Importan

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  • Julio J. Elías

Abstract

El problema del faltante de órganos para trasplantes es grave en la mayoría de los países con programas desarrollados de trasplantes. En este ensayo resumo la investigación sobre el problema del faltante de órganos que desarrollamos de forma conjunta con Gary Becker de la Universidad de Chicago. Primero muestro la causa principal del faltante de órganos y el costo que impone el sistema actual sobre aquellos que esperan por un órgano. Luego presento una propuesta que desarrollamos con Gary Becker para resolver el problema de manera efectiva. Nuestra solución está basada en la utilización del mecanismo de los precios: Pagar por órganos. Con Becker mostramos que la introducción de incentivos monetarios para los donantes aumentaría la oferta de órganos suficientemente como para eliminar las largas colas de espera. Estos incentivos no aumentarían el costo de trasplantes en un porcentaje importante y lograrían eliminar la espera, aumentar la calidad de vida y reducir la cantidad de muertes de manera contundente. También analizo la efectividad de enfoques alternativos basados en el altruismo que han sido utilizados para intentar solucionar el problema, como ser el desarrollo del sistema de donaciones cruzadas (Kidney Paired Donation) y la adopción del sistema de consentimiento presunto para la procuración de órganos. Aún cuando los beneficios de eliminar el faltante de órganos y acabar con las muertes en la lista de espera son significativos, algunos se oponen a la propuesta de pagar por órganos. Los críticos afirman que el pago de órganos sería ineficaz, que sería inmoral porque se trata de la venta de partes del cuerpo humano y que los principales donantes serían personas pobres desesperadas, que podrían llegar a lamentar su decisión. En la última parte discuto sobre la “repugnancia” hacia la comercialización de órganos como una restricción al desarrollo del mercado.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio J. Elías, 2014. "La Economía de los Trasplantes de Organos: Los Incentivos Importan," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 543, Universidad del CEMA.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:543
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 37-58, Summer.
    2. Alain Kabundi, 2012. "Working Paper 152 - Dynamics of Inflation in Uganda," Working Paper Series 401, African Development Bank.
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