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Earmarking in the U.S. Department of Transportation Research Programs

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  • Brach, Ann
  • wachs, Martin

Abstract

US Department of Transportation research funds historically have been awarded on the basis of competition and merit review. Over the last fifteen years, however, transportation research programs have seen dramatic growth in earmarking, a practice in which Congress designates research funds for specific institutions named in legislation. This paper discusses driving forces for and potential risks associated with this practice and presents data on earmarking trends from five USDOT agencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Brach, Ann & wachs, Martin, 2005. "Earmarking in the U.S. Department of Transportation Research Programs," Institute of Transportation Studies, Research Reports, Working Papers, Proceedings qt9vf8844t, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt9vf8844t
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    File URL: https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9vf8844t.pdf;origin=repeccitec
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kok, Holmer & Faems, Dries & de Faria, Pedro, 2022. "Pork Barrel or Barrel of Gold? Examining the performance implications of earmarking in public R&D grants," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(7).
    2. Sciara, Gian-Claudia, 2012. "Financing congressional earmarks: Implications for transport policy and planning," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1328-1342.
    3. Chen, Jiandong & Yu, Jie & Shen, Zhiyang & Song, Malin & Zhou, Ziqi, 2023. "Debt financing and maintenance expenditure: Theory and evidence on government-operated toll roads in China," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(1).
    4. Anastasopoulos, Panagiotis Ch. & Florax, Raymond J.G.M. & Labi, Samuel & Karlaftis, Mathew G., 2010. "Contracting in highway maintenance and rehabilitation: Are spatial effects important?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 136-146, March.

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