It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over: English Auctions with Subsequent Negotiations
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- Koska, Onur A. & Stähler, Frank, 2021. "It ain’t over until it’s over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 121-124.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
English auction; negotiations; reserve prices;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2020-03-30 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2020-03-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2020-03-30 (Microeconomics)
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