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Varieties of Creditor Protection: Insolvency Law Reform & Credit Expansion in Developed Market Economies

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  • Simon Deakin
  • Viviana Mollica
  • Prabirjit Sarkar

Abstract

We examine the relationship between creditor protection, law reform and credit expansion using longitudinal data for four developed market economies between 1970 and 2005. By decomposing the different elements of creditor protection, we show that civil law countries (France and Germany) have developed a high level of protection for creditors in the form of controls over the management of debtor firms, while common law countries (UK and USA) have arrived at a high degree of protection in relation to secured creditors' contractual rights over firms' assets. Using panel causality tests and dynamic panel data modelling, we show that laws strengthening creditors' control over debtor firms in these four countries had a long-term positive effect on credit expansion, while reforms increasing secured creditors' rights had a negative effect. We explore the implications of our findings for legal origin theory and the varieties of capitalism approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Deakin & Viviana Mollica & Prabirjit Sarkar, 2015. "Varieties of Creditor Protection: Insolvency Law Reform & Credit Expansion in Developed Market Economies," Working Papers wp473, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Closset, Frédéric & Urban, Daniel, 2019. "The balance of power between creditors and the firm: Evidence from German insolvency law," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 454-477.
    2. Nicos Zafiris, 2018. "Why We Should Change Our Attitude Towards Distressed Firms," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1), pages 74-87, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic policy; financial development; varieties of capitalism; institutional complementarities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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