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The Effect of Board Structure on Bidder-Shareholders' Wealth: Further Evidence from the UK Bidding Firms

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  • Charalambos Th. Constantinou
  • Costas Th. Constantinou

Abstract

In this study we provide evidence of cross-sectional dependence of bidder-shareholder wealth and target’s board characteristics. More specifically we provide evidence that the percentage of non-executives, the board size, the stock holdings of executives, and the other directorships held by non-executives serving the target board are important in assessing the announcement of the bid, whereas in the bidder’s board only the percentage of non-executive directors is important for bidder-shareholders. In addition to that we provide evidence that some of these relationships are not monotonic in nature. Finally, in this study it is documented that bidder-shareholder wealth is favoured in acquisitions where bidders have marginally more executive than non-executive directors in their boards and therefore the question arises as to whether “dependent” boards are more efficient than “independent” ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Charalambos Th. Constantinou & Costas Th. Constantinou, 2003. "The Effect of Board Structure on Bidder-Shareholders' Wealth: Further Evidence from the UK Bidding Firms," Working Papers wp261, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp261
    Note: PRO-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Takeovers; Board Characteristics; Corporate Governance; Shareholder-wealth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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