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Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements

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Abstract

Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to reduce political violence in regions of conflict, but agreements are often followed by violence. This is due to the fact that such agreements are introduced during periods of political violence when a country is inside the conflict trap, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the agreement from the political context that generates persistent political violence. In this study we match on pre-agreement risk to estimate the effects of power sharing agreements on violence using a difference-in-difference method. The results show that violence falls immediately after an agreement, with the effects strengthening over time. Subsequent changes in institutional features of democracy, such as the absence of exclusion, are also associated with reductions in political violence.

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  • Mueller, H. & Rauh, C., 2022. "Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2261, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:2261
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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