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Rebellion, repression and welfare

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  • Juan F. Vargas

Abstract

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression{driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan F. Vargas, 2010. "Rebellion, repression and welfare," Documentos de Trabajo 6906, Universidad del Rosario.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:006906
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Anderton Charles H., 2014. "Killing Civilians as an Inferior Input in a Rational Choice Model of Genocide and Mass Killing," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 327-346, April.
    2. Johnson Gwatipedza & Thorsten Janus, 2019. "Public investment under autocracy and social unrest," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 112-135, March.
    3. Andrés Zambrano & Hernando Zuleta, 2016. "Revealing the preferences of the FARC," Documentos CEDE 14572, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rebellion; Repression; Inequality; Markov Perfect Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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