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Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance"

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  • Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance"," Working Papers 2010-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-897, June.
    3. Morris, Stephen, 1994. "Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1327-1347, November.
    4. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.

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