Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects
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- F. Barigozzi & B. Villeneuve, 2004. "The signaling effect of tax policy," Working Papers 500, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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