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Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

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  • Manelli, Alejandro M

Abstract

Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. The author proves that adding cheap talk to these games 'solves' the nonexistence problem: the limit of sequential equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is a sequential equilibrium outcome of the cheap-talk extension of the limit game. In addition, when the signaling space has no isolated points, any cheap-talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be approximated by a sequential [epsilon]-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.

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  • Manelli, Alejandro M, 1996. "Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 917-942, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:64:y:1996:i:4:p:917-42
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    Cited by:

    1. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
    2. Vaccari, Federico, 2023. "Competition in costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    3. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
    4. Gradwohl, Ronen & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Perception games and privacy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 293-308.
    5. Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Competition in Signaling," MPRA Paper 106071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2011. "Correlated equilibrium existence for infinite games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 638-655, March.
    7. Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2011. "Balance and discontinuities in infinite games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 656-671, March.
    8. Kim, Kyungmin & Pogach, Jonathan, 2014. "Honesty vs. advocacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 51-74.
    9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5402 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    11. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
    12. Roger B. Myerson & Philip J. Reny, 2020. "Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 495-531, March.
    13. Chen, Ying, 2011. "Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 401-424, March.
    14. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.
    15. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    16. Manelli, Alejandro M., 1997. "The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 152-173, May.
    17. Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
    18. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    19. F. Barigozzi & B. Villeneuve, 2001. "Influencing the Misinformed Misbehaver: An Analysis of Public Policy towards Uncertainty and External Effects," Working Papers 404, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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