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Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

Author

Listed:
  • Daeyoung Jeong

    (Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea)

Abstract

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited information. A simple cheap talk strategy of the expert can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. When there is a significant informational gap, decision makers vote in the expert's interest by focusing only on the expert's message, even though they know she has her own bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Daeyoung Jeong, 2017. "Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers," Working Papers 2017-19, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    • Handle: RePEc:bok:wpaper:1719
    as

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    File URL: http://papers.bok.or.kr/RePEc_attach/wpaper/english/wp-2017-19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
    2. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
    3. Péter Kondor, 2012. "The More We Know about the Fundamental, the Less We Agree on the Price," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1175-1207.
    4. Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2017. "Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(1), pages 129-145, January.
    5. Schnakenberg, Keith E., 2015. "Expert advice to a voting body," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 102-113.
    6. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Rothschild, Michael & Winship, Christopher, 1984. "Information processing and jury decisionmaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 245-278, April.
    7. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
    8. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap Talk; Voting; Polarization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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