IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boe/boeewp/1057.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Screening using a menu of contracts: a structural model of lending markets

Author

Listed:
  • Taburet, Arthur

    (Duke’s Fuqua School of Business)

  • Polo, Alberto

    (Bank of England)

  • Vo, Quynh-Anh

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

When lenders screen borrowers using a menu of contracts, they generate a contractual externality by making the composition of their competitors’ borrowers worse. Using data from the UK mortgage market and a structural model of screening with endogenous menus, this paper quantifies the impact of asymmetric information on equilibrium contracts and welfare. Counterfactual simulations show that, because of the externality, there is too much screening along the loan to value dimension. The deadweight loss, expressed in borrowers’ utility, is equivalent to an interest rate increase of 30 basis points (a 15% increase) on all loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Taburet, Arthur & Polo, Alberto & Vo, Quynh-Anh, 2024. "Screening using a menu of contracts: a structural model of lending markets," Bank of England working papers 1057, Bank of England.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:1057
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/working-paper/2024/screening-using-a-menu-of-contracts-a-structural-model-of-lending-markets.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    2. Bernard Salanie & Frank A. Wolak, 2018. "Fast, "robust", and approximately correct: estimating mixed demand systems," CeMMAP working papers CWP64/18, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2009. "Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With a Consumer Credit Field Experiment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1993-2008, November.
    5. Gavazza, Alessandro & Benetton, Matteo & Surico, Paolo, 2021. "Mortgage Pricing and Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 16456, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2019. "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 338-377.
    7. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    8. James Cloyne & Kilian Huber & Ethan Ilzetzki & Henrik Kleven, 2019. "The Effect of House Prices on Household Borrowing: A New Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(6), pages 2104-2136, June.
    9. John Y. Campbell, 2013. "Mortgage Market Design," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33.
    10. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Mark R. Cullen, 2010. "Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 877-921.
    11. Nevo, Aviv, 2001. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 307-342, March.
    12. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    13. Robert W. Rosenthal & Andrew Weiss, 1984. "Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 333-342.
    14. Andrew Hertzberg & Andres Liberman & Daniel Paravisini, 2018. "Screening on Loan Terms: Evidence from Maturity Choice in Consumer Credit," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(9), pages 3532-3567.
    15. Pierre André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work," CESifo Working Paper Series 738, CESifo.
    16. Peter Arcidiacono & Robert A. Miller, 2011. "Conditional Choice Probability Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models With Unobserved Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(6), pages 1823-1867, November.
    17. Alon Eizenberg, 2014. "Upstream Innovation and Product Variety in the U.S. Home PC Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 1003-1045.
    18. Lee, Robin S. & Pakes, Ariel, 2009. "Multiple equilibria and selection by learning in an applied setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 13-16, July.
    19. Aiyar, Shekhar & Calomiris, Charles & Hooley, John & Korniyenko , Yevgeniya & Wieladek, Tomasz, 2014. "The international transmission of bank capital requirements: evidence from the United Kingdom," Bank of England working papers 497, Bank of England.
    20. Ben Handel & Igal Hendel & Michael D. Whinston, 2015. "Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1261-1313, July.
    21. Griffith, Rachel & Crawford, Gregory & Iaria, Alessandro, 2016. "Preference Estimation with Unobserved Choice Set Heterogeneity using Sufficient Sets," CEPR Discussion Papers 11675, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    22. W. Ross Morrow & Steven J. Skerlos, 2011. "Fixed-Point Approaches to Computing Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Prices Under Mixed-Logit Demand," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 328-345, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Coen, Jamie & Coen, Patrick & Hüser, Anne-Caroline, 2024. "Collateral demand in wholesale funding markets," Bank of England working papers 1082, Bank of England.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. DeFusco, Anthony A. & Tang, Huan & Yannelis, Constantine, 2022. "Measuring the welfare cost of asymmetric information in consumer credit markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 821-840.
    2. Matteo Benetton, 2021. "Leverage Regulation and Market Structure: A Structural Model of the U.K. Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 2997-3053, December.
    3. Gregory S. Crawford & Nicola Pavanini & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(7), pages 1659-1701, July.
    4. Arpit Gupta & Christopher Hansman, 2022. "Selection, Leverage, and Default in the Mortgage Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 720-770.
    5. Neale Mahoney & E. Glen Weyl, 2017. "Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 637-651, July.
    6. Gemmo, Irina & Kubitza, Christian & Rothschild, Casey, 2020. "Constrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    7. Andres Liberman & Christopher A. Neilson & Luis Opazo & Seth Zimmerman, 2019. "Equilibrium Effects of Asymmetric Information on Consumer Credit Markets," Working Papers 2019-7, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    8. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, 2023. "Empirical analyses of selection and welfare in insurance markets: a self-indulgent survey," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 48(2), pages 167-191, September.
    9. Dosis, Anastasios, 2019. "Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 52-59.
    10. Liu, Lu, 2023. "The demand for long-term mortgage contracts and the role of collateral," ESRB Working Paper Series 142, European Systemic Risk Board.
    11. Pakes, Ariel, 2017. "Empirical tools and competition analysis: Past progress and current problems," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 241-266.
    12. Andres Liberman & Christopher Neilson & Luis Opazo & Seth Zimmerman, 2018. "The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 25097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Liu, Lu, 2023. "The demand for long-term mortgage contracts and the role of collateral," Bank of England working papers 1009, Bank of England.
    14. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021. "Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2623-2659, August.
    15. Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 152-157.
    16. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco, 2019. "Too Little Lending: A Problem of Symmetric Information," MPRA Paper 93700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Choudhary, M. Ali & Jain, Anil, 2022. "Finance and inequality: The distributional impacts of bank credit rationing," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    18. Inderst, Roman & Wambach, Achim, 2001. "Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1981-1992, December.
    19. Duqi, Andi & McGowan, Danny & Onali, Enrico & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2021. "Natural disasters and economic growth: The role of banking market structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    20. von Siemens, Ferdinand A. & Kosfeld, Michael, 2014. "Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 181-198.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Adverse selection; screening; structural model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boe:boeewp:1057. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Digital Media Team (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/boegvuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.