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Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games

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  • Sass, Linda

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

Riedel and Sass (2013) propose a framework for normal form games where players can use imprecise probabilistic devices. We extend this strategic use of objective ambiguity to extensive form games. We show that with rectangularity of Ellsberg strategies we have dynamic consistency in the sense of Kuhn (1953): rectangular Ellsberg strategies are equivalent to Ellsberg behavior strategies. We provide an example for our result and define Ellsberg equilibrium in such extensive form Ellsberg games.

Suggested Citation

  • Sass, Linda, 2014. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Form Ellsberg Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 478, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:478
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2674088/2901849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aryal, Gaurab & Stauber, Ronald, 2014. "A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 110-114.
    2. Frank Riedel, 2017. "Uncertain Acts in Games," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 275-292, December.
    3. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2017. "Modes of ambiguous communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 271-292.
    4. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
    5. Dorian Beauchêne, 2016. "Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 245-269, February.
    6. Muraviev, Igor & Riedel, Frank & Sass, Linda, 2017. "Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 26-41.

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    Keywords

    Rectangularity; Kuhn's Theorem; Strategic Ambiguity; Extensive Form Ellsberg Games; Knightian Uncertainty in Games; Objective Ambiguity;
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