IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-01886573.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information

Author

Listed:
  • Frank Riedel

    (UJ - University of Johannesburg [South Africa], Universitat Bielefeld)

  • Jean-Marc Tallon

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vassili Vergopoulos

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper extends decision theory under imprecise probabilistic information to dynamic settings. We explore the relationship between the given objective probabilistic information, an agent's subjective multiple priors, and updating. Dynamic consistency implies rectangular sets of priors at the subjective level. As the objective probabilistic information need not be consistent with rectangularity at the subjective level, agents might select priors outside the objective probabilistic information while respecting the support of the given set of priors. Under suitable additional axioms, the subjective set of priors belongs to the rectangular hull of the objective probabilistic information.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Riedel & Jean-Marc Tallon & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2018. "Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01886573, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01886573
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gajdos, T. & Hayashi, T. & Tallon, J.-M. & Vergnaud, J.-C., 2008. "Attitude toward imprecise information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 27-65, May.
    2. Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo & Rustichini, Aldo, 2006. "Dynamic variational preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 4-44, May.
    3. ,, 2011. "Dynamic choice under ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(3), September.
    4. Riedel, Frank, 2004. "Dynamic coherent risk measures," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 185-200, August.
    5. Epstein Larry G. & Le Breton Michel, 1993. "Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-22, October.
    6. , & ,, 2007. "Updating preferences with multiple priors," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    7. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires, 2002. "A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 137-152, September.
    8. Epstein, Larry G. & Schneider, Martin, 2003. "Recursive multiple-priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 1-31, November.
    9. Marciano Siniscalchi, 2001. "Bayesian Updating for General Maxmin Expected Utility Preferences," Discussion Papers 1366, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. HILL, Brian, 2013. "Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguity: A Reappraisal," HEC Research Papers Series 983, HEC Paris.
    11. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    12. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    13. Sarin, Rakesh & Wakker, Peter P, 1998. "Dynamic Choice and NonExpected Utility," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 87-119, November.
    14. Daniel Ellsberg, 1961. "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 75(4), pages 643-669.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Working Papers halshs-02563318, HAL.
    2. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Lorenzo Bastianello & José Heleno Faro & Ana Santos, 2022. "Dynamically consistent objective and subjective rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 477-504, September.
    4. Giulianella Coletti & Davide Petturiti & Barbara Vantaggi, 2019. "Dutch book rationality conditions for conditional preferences under ambiguity," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 279(1), pages 115-150, August.
    5. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Post-Print halshs-02900497, HAL.
    6. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    7. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02563318, HAL.
    8. Ceron, Federica & Vergopoulos, Vassili, 2022. "Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    9. Lorenzo Bastianello & Jos'e Heleno Faro & Ana Santos, 2020. "Dynamically Consistent Objective and Subjective Rationality," Papers 2004.12347, arXiv.org.
    10. Yi-Hsuan Lin & Fernando Payró Chew, 2024. "Updating Under Imprecise Information," Working Papers 1424, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02900497, HAL.
    12. Kops, Christopher & Pasichnichenko, Illia, 2023. "Testing negative value of information and ambiguity aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    13. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
    2. Faro, José Heleno & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2019. "Dynamic objective and subjective rationality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    3. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02563318, HAL.
    4. Georgalos, Konstantinos, 2021. "Dynamic decision making under ambiguity: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 28-46.
    5. Spyros Galanis, 2021. "Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1467-1497, June.
    6. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Post-Print halshs-02900497, HAL.
    7. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02900497, HAL.
    8. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20008, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Federica Ceron & Vassili Vergopoulos, 2020. "Recursive objective and subjective multiple priors," Working Papers halshs-02563318, HAL.
    10. Ellis, Andrew, 2018. "On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 241-249.
    11. Alexander Zimper, 2011. "Do Bayesians Learn Their Way Out of Ambiguity?," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 8(4), pages 269-285, December.
    12. Pahlke, Marieke, 2022. "Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 85-108.
    13. Zimper, Alexander, 2009. "Half empty, half full and why we can agree to disagree forever," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 283-299, August.
    14. Klibanoff, Peter & Marinacci, Massimo & Mukerji, Sujoy, 2009. "Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 930-976, May.
    15. Gumen, Anna & Savochkin, Andrei, 2013. "Dynamically stable preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1487-1508.
    16. Ceron, Federica & Vergopoulos, Vassili, 2022. "Objective rationality and recursive multiple priors," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    17. Dominiak, Adam & Duersch, Peter & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 625-638.
    18. Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima, 2019. "Consequentialism and dynamic consistency in updating ambiguous beliefs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 223-250, July.
    19. Han Bleichrodt & Jurgen Eichberger & Simon Grant & David Kelsey & Chen Li, 2018. "A Test of Dynamic Consistency and Consequentialism in the Presence of Ambiguity," Discussion Papers 1803, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    20. Hill, Brian, 2022. "Updating confidence in beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01886573. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.