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Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability

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  • A. Rubinstein
  • A. Wolinsky

Abstract

For a steady state to be a Nash equilibrium the agents have to perfectly observe the actions of others. This paper suggests a solution concept for cases where players observe only an imperfect signal of what the others' actions are. The model is enriched by specifying the signal that each player has about the actions taken by the others. The solution, which we call rationalizbale conjectural equilibrium (RCE), is a profile of actions such that each player's action is optimal, given the assumption that it is common knowledge that all players maximize their expected utility given their knowledge. The RCE occupies an intermediary position between Nash equilibrium on one hand and Rationalizability style Bernheim-Pearce on the other hand. The concept is demonstrated by several examples in which it refines the rationalizability concept and still is not equivalent to Nash equilibrium.
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  • A. Rubinstein & A. Wolinsky, 2010. "Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 369, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:369
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    1. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    2. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 2003. "Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-38, March.
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